SARS oubreaks in Ontario, Hong Kong and Singapore: the role of diagnosis
  and isolation as a control mechanism by Chowell, Gerardo et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
-b
io
/0
50
30
02
v1
  [
q-
bio
.O
T]
  1
 M
ar 
20
05
SARS outbreaks in Ontario, Hong Kong and Singapore:
the role of diagnosis and isolation as a control mechanism
G. Chowell1,2, P. W. Fenimore1, M. A. Castillo-Garsow3, and C. Castillo-Chavez1,2
1 Center for Nonlinear Studies
MS B258
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Los Alamos, NM 87545
2 Department of Biological Statistics and Computational Biology
Cornell University
Warren Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853
3 Universidad de Colima
Facultad de Ciencias & Facultad de Letras
Col. Villas de San Sebastia´n
28045, Colima, Colima. Me´xico.
LA-UR-03-2653
Abstract
In this article we use global and regional data from the SARS epidemic in conjunction
with a model of susceptible, exposed, infective, diagnosed, and recovered classes of people
(“SEIJR”) to extract average properties and rate constants for those populations. The
model is fitted to data from the Ontario (Toronto) in Canada, Hong Kong in China
and Singapore outbreaks and predictions are made based on various assumptions and
observations, including the current effect of isolating individuals diagnosed with SARS.
The epidemic dynamics for Hong Kong and Singapore appear to be different from the
dynamics in Toronto, Ontario. Toronto shows a very rapid increase in the number of
cases between March 31st and April 6th, followed by a significant slowing in the number
of new cases. We explain this as the result of an increase in the diagnostic rate and in
the effectiveness of patient isolation after March 26th. Our best estimates are consistent
with SARS eventually being contained in Toronto, although the time of containment is
sensitive to the parameters in our model. It is shown that despite the empirically modeled
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heterogeneity in transmission, SARS’ average reproductive number is 1.2, a value quite
similar to that computed for some strains of influenza [2]. Although it would not be
surprising to see levels of SARS infection higher than ten per cent in some regions of
the world (if unchecked), lack of data and the observed heterogeneity and sensitivity of
parameters prevent us from predicting the long-term impact of SARS. The possibility
that 10 or more percent of the world population at risk could eventually be infected with
the virus in conjunction with a mortality rate of three-to-seven percent or more, and
indications of significant improvement in Toronto support the stringent measures that
have been taken to isolate diagnosed cases.
1 Introduction
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a new respiratory disease which was first identified
in China’s southern province of Guangdong. SARS is not merely a local endemic disease: it
poses a serious risk to the medical community, is a threat to international travelers, is having
a substantial negative economic impact in parts of East Asia and is spreading world-wide. The
serious danger SARS poses to the medical community is illustrated by the numerous cases
of transmission to health-care workers. Startlingly, the man who awakened the world to the
dangers of SARS, Dr. Carlo Urbani, succumbed to the disease. Cases of transmission between
aircraft passengers are suspected, and relatively short visits to epidemic regions have resulted
in infection. The most striking feature of SARS, however, has proven to be its ability to rapidly
spread on a global scale. One man with SARS made 7 flights: from Hong Kong to Mu¨nich to
Barcelona to Frankfurt to London, back to Mu¨nich and Frankfurt before finally returning to
Hong Kong [3]. Another individual, a 26-year-old airport worker, appears to have transmitted
the disease to 112 people [4]. Clearly, there is an unfortunate interaction between the incubation
period of the virus, the widely distributed severity and infectiousness of SARS in different people
and the speed and volume of passenger air travel. The adverse economic impact in parts of East
Asia far exceeds the disruption of previous outbreaks of avian influenza, earning comparison
with the 1998 financial market crisis in that part of the world [5, 6, 7]. Although the causative
agent of SARS has been determined [8, 9], a detailed understanding of the causative virus’
pathogenticity and routes of transmission and the dynamics of the epidemic is still at a very
early stage. It is uncertain how the virus is transmitted: by droplet or airborne transmission
or person-to-person contact. The recent development of laboratory tests promises to improve
the epidemiological situation somewhat [10].
SARS is a public health crisis on a scale rarely seen. The obvious question in such a crisis
is, “can SARS be contained?” In this study, we report transmission parameters and epidemic
dynamics from a model based on classes of people who are susceptible, exposed, infectious,
diagnosed, and recovered (“SEIJR”) that includes the effect of patient isolation. Our model is
consistent with the possibility of containment in Toronto, Ontario.
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2 SARS epidemiology and related issues
SARS was first identified in November 2002 in the Guongdong Province of China [11]. By
February 26, 2003 officials in Hong Kong reported their first cases of SARS and no later than
March 14th of this year the virus reached Canada [12]. As of April 17th, Canada is the only
location outside of Asia which has seen deaths as a result of SARS (13 so far) [13]. U. S. health
officials are currently investigating 199 cases in 34 states (Apri 17, 2003) [14].
An individual exposed to SARS may become infectious after an incubation period of 2− 7
days (or longer) [33] with 3− 5 days being most common [15]. Most infected individuals either
recover, typically after 7 to 10 days, or suffer 4% mortality or higher [16, 21, 35]. SARS appears
to be most serious in people over age 40, especially those who have other medical problems such
as heart or liver disease. Its symptoms are similar to pneumonia or other respiratory ailments
and include a high fever (≥ 38◦C), shortness of breath, dry cough, headache, stiff or achy
muscles, fatigue and diarrhea [17]. These symptoms, however, are not uniform. In the US, for
example, the disease seems to be a milder one than in Asia [18]. The result has been that SARS
was, and for the moment remains, a diagnosis of exclusion.
Presently, there is no treatment for SARS [19] and diagnostic tests are just becoming avail-
able [10]. The mortality rate is reported to be 4% or higher world-wide[21, 35]. Experts
estimate that between 80 and 90 percent of people with SARS recover without medical inter-
vention, while the condition of the remaining victims requires medical care [17]. As of April
17, 2003, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported 3, 389 cases (a mixture of probable
or suspected cases) in 26 countries. 165 victims are reported to have died [14].
Although researchers in the Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam recently demonstrated
that a coronavirus (some of which produce common colds) is the causative agent of SARS,
the mode of transmission still remains unknown [14]. The current hypothesis is that SARS
is transmitted mainly by close person-to-person contact which may explain the relatively slow
transmission scale. However, it could also be transmitted through contaminated objects, air or
by other unknown ways [22]. It is also a mystery how the disease originated, whether in birds,
pigs or other animals, nor is it known if the origin is rural or urban [23].
In this article, a simple model for SARS outbreaks is formulated (see [24]). The model is
used in conjunction with global and local SARS data to estimate the initial growth rate of
the SARS epidemic. These rates are used to estimate SARS’ basic reproductive number, R0,
the classical epidemiological measure associated with the reproductive power of a disease. R0
estimates the average number of secondary cases of infection generated by a typical infectious
individual in a population of susceptibles [25] and hence, it is used to estimate the initial growth
of a SARS outbreak. We estimate (using data from Ontario, Hong Kong and Singapore) that
R0 is about 1.2. This value is not too different from past estimates of R0 for influenza (see
[2]) despite the fact that superspreaders of SARS have been identified. In fact, the parameter
values resulting on this R0, on our population-scaled model, can lead to extremely high levels of
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infection). We show, via simple extrapolation, that the estimated rate of growth is consistent
with the reported date for the first cases of SARS in Hong Kong, however the first cases in
Toronto may be several weeks earlier than the February 23 date of the first case reported by
the Canadian Health Ministries [26]. Our best “rough” estimate for Toronto is that the first
case occurred sometime around January 29th, and not later than February 28th. The data for
Hong Kong are fitted by fixing the parameters k, δ and γ1 based on estimates of the observed
rates for the corresponding processes. The growth rate β is estimated from observed “model-
free” exponential growth in Singapore and Hong Hong. The average diagnostic rate α and the
measure of heterogeneity between the two susceptible classes p and the effectiveness of patient
isolation measures (related to l) are then varied to fit the initial data for Hong Kong and
Singapore. To model the data in Toronto, we must postulate that the parameters describing
the rate of diagnosis (α) and isolation (l) in the Canadian outbreak changed radically on March
27. Two hospitals in Toronto were closed about that time: Scarborough Grace Hospital on
March 25th and York Central Hospital on March 28th [20]. The remainder of this article is
organized as follows: Section 4 introduces the basic model and gives a formula for the basic
reproductive number R0; Section 5 describes the results of simulations and connections to data;
and, Section 6 collects our final thoughts.
3 SARS’ Transmission Model
U. S. data is limited and sparsely distributed [27, 28] while the quality of China’s data is hard to
evaluate [29]. On the other hand, there appears to be enough data for Toronto [26], Singapore
and Hong Kong [30] to make limited preliminary predictions using a model that includes the
effects of suspected mechanisms for the spread of SARS. Limited data and inconclusive epi-
demiological information place severe restrictions on efforts to model the global spread of the
SARS etiological agent.
Thus, we model single outbreaks, ignoring demographic processes other than the impact
of SARS on survival. The model is applied to data from Toronto, Hong Kong and Singapore.
Because the outbreak dynamics in Singapore and Hong Kong are different from those in Toronto,
some of the results may only be indicative of what is happening in those regions of the world (in
particular our parameters α and l may change). The situation must be re-evaluated frequently
as SARS continues its travels around the world.
Here we describe a model that incorporates, in a rather crude way, some of the important
characteristics suggested in the literature (unequal susceptibility, symptomatic and asymp-
tomatic individuals, mode of transmission, superspreaders, etc.) [22, 31, 32, 27]. The goal is
to use the results for single outbreaks as a first step in our efforts to gauge the global impact
of SARS. Hence, we focus on three “closed” populations (Southern Ontario (Toronto), Singa-
pore and Hong Kong) and postulate differences in the degree of susceptibility to SARS [4, 17].
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These differences may be due to variations in contact rates, age-dependent susceptibility or
“unknown” genetic factors. This last assumption is handled (in a rather crude and arbitrary
way) via the introduction of two distinct susceptible classes: S1, the most susceptible, and S2,
less so. Initially, S1 = ρN and S2 = (1 − ρ)N where ρ is the proportion of the population
size N that is initially at higher risk of SARS infection. The parameter p is a measure of
reduced susceptibility to SARS in class S2 [17, 4]. E (“exposed”) denotes the class composed
of asymptomatic, possibly infectious (at least some of the time) individuals. Typically, it takes
some time before asymptomatic infected individuals become infectious. The possibility of lim-
ited transmission from class E is included, in a rather crude way, via the parameter q (see
Table 1). The class I denotes infected, symptomatic, infectious, and undiagnosed individuals.
I-individuals move into the diagnosed class J at the rate α. Individuals recover at the rates
γ1 (I class) and γ2 (J class). The rate δ denotes SARS’ disease-induced mortality. The classes
R is included to keep track of the cumulative number of diagnosed and recovered, respectively.
Furthermore, it is assumed that diagnosed individuals are handled with care. Hence, they
might not be (effectively) as infectious as those who have not been diagnosed (if l is small).
The parameter l takes into account their reduced impact on the transmission process (small l
represents effective measures taken to isolate diagnosed cases and visa versa). Table 1 includes
parameters’ definitions and the initial values used. Our SARS epidemiological model is given
by the following nonlinear system of differential equations:
S˙1 = −βS1
(I+qE+lJ)
N
,
S˙2 = −βpS2
(I+qE+lJ)
N
,
E˙ = β(S1 + pS2)
(I+qE+lJ)
N
− kE,
I˙ = kE − (α+ γ1 + δ)I,
J˙ = αI − (γ2 + δ)J,
R˙ = γ1I + γ2J,
(1)
which is refered to as “SEIJR,” after the variables used to name the classes.
The values of p and q are not known and are fixed arbitrarily while l and α are varied
and optimized to fit the existing data (least-squares criterion) for Hong Kong, Singapore and
Toronto. We did not explored the sensitivity of the model to variations in p and q because they
are not known and cannot be controlled. All other parameters were roughly estimated from
data [26, 30] and current literature [22, 33, 15, 16]. In particular, the transmission rate β is
calculated from the dominant root of the third order equation obtained from the linearization
around the disease-free equilibrium [25]. The parameters l and α were allowed to vary when
fitting the data for each location (Singapore, Hong Kong and Toronto). Some restrictions apply,
for example, the value of α > γ1. We also require that 1/γ2 = 1/γ1 − 1/α, a statement that
members of the diagnosed class J recover at the same rate as members of the undiagnosed class
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I. 1/γ1 has been reported to be between 7 and 10 days [21, 16]. From the second generator
approach [25], we obtain the following expression for the basic reproductive number:
R0 = {β [ρ+ p(1− ρ)]}
{
q
k
+ 1
α+γ1+δ
+ αl
(α+γ1+δ)(γ2+δ)
}
(2)
which can be easily given an epidemiological interpretation. The use of parameters estimated
from Hong Kong (Table 1) gives a values of R0 = 1.2 (Hong Kong) and R0 = 1.2 (Toronto,
assuming exponential growth) and R0 = 1.1 (Singapore).
4 Simulation Results
Initial rates of growth for SARS outbreaks in different parts of the world (see Figure 2) are
computed using the data provided by WHO [30] and the Canadian Ministry of Health [26].
These rates are computed exclusively from the number of cases reported between March 31 and
April 14. The values obtained are 0.0405 (world data), 0.0496 (Hong Kong), 0.054 (Canada),
0.054 (Toronto) and 0.037 (Singapore).
For our numerical simulations, we start with an infectious individual (not yet diagnosed,
I(0) = 1) and crude estimates for the start of SARS outbreaks (t0) are obtained from the
formula t0 = t − (
1
r
log(x(t))), which assumes initial exponential growth (r, the estimated
“model-free” rate of growth from the time series x(t) of the cumulative number of SARS cases).
Results for Toronto, Hong Kong, Singapore and aggregated world data are shown in Table 2.
The estimated “world” start of the outbreak is November 5, a date consistent with the fact
that the first SARS case was detected in Guangdong, China in November [11]. These dates are
used as the starting time of the respective outbreaks.
For the case of the Province of Ontario, Canada the total population N is approximately
12 million. We assume that the population at major risk of SARS infection lives in Ontario’s
southern part (particularly Toronto), and is approximately 40% of the total population (ρ = 0.4
in our model). It is worth pointing out that this value of ρ is not critical (that is, the most
sensitive) in the model. The “model-free” approximately exponential growth rates for the
various regions of the world are roughly similar except for Canada from March 31st (day 61)
to April 6th (beginning the day of the jump in the number of reported Canadian cases), the
number of diagnosed cases grew ∼ exp(0.081t), where t is measured in days. This rate is
substantially higher than elsewhere in the world. In the subsequent week (beginning April 7th,
day 68) the number of probable or suspected Canadian cases rapidly rolls over to a smaller
growth rate not too far from the rest of the world. We conclude, based on the coincidence of
the Canadian hospital closures, the jump in the reported number of Canadian SARS cases on
March 31st and the rapid rise in recognized cases in the following week, that Canadian doctors
were rapidly diagnosing pre-existing cases of SARS (in either class E or I on March 26th). If
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we make the assumption that the fundamental disease spreading parameters other than α and
l are roughly constant throughout the world prior to March 26th, we can reach two important
conclusions. Beginning on March 26th, in Toronto:
• α changed from a number 1/α ≈ 1/γ1 − 2 ≈ 6 days to 1/α1 ≤ 3 days, and
• l changed from an uncertain and relatively large value l > 1/2 to l ≤ 0.1.
If we assume that the fundamental growth rate β is essentially constant from one region of
the world to another, it is difficult for our model to produce growth rates r well above the
world average, except as a transient response to differences in diagnostic rate α (due to delays
in response or change in policy). Similarly, the SEIJR model requires fairly small values of
l to achieve a rapid roll-over in the growth rate of recognized cases. The parametric details
of how a “second” initial condition for Toronto on March 26th is generated do not affect the
qualitative aspect of this argument: the Canadian data prior to March 31st (the day of the
large jump) are probably not as meaningful as data after that date, and hence only bound the
model from below prior to March 26th. The essential aspect of this before-and-after hospital
closure argument is that there were substantially more undiagnosed people in classes E and
I than in class J on March 26th. This is a reasonable assumption given that the number of
cases reported by Canadian officials more than double from March 30th to March 31st. The
introduction of behavioral changes starting on March 26 (t = 57 days),alters the fate of the
disease in a dramatic fashion (see Table 3).
Fitting the model to the Hong Kong and Singapore data is carried out in a similar fashion
with ρ = 0.4, (Hong Kong has about 7.5 million inhabitants, Singapore 4.6 million). The
estimated transmission rate from Hong Kong data is β ≈ 0.75 and for Singapore β ≈ 0.68. Both
Hong Kong and Singapore’s data are fit with the value q = 0.1. Hong Kong and Singapore’s
measure of contact between diagnosed SARS cases and susceptibles are l = 0.38 and 0.40,
respectively (see Figure 4). Even though there is some heterogeneity in the parameters for
Hong Kong and Singapore, they provide an important calibration of our model. Their values
for l and α are roughly consistent with each other, indicating that the difference with Toronto
is significant within our model, and pointing to the joint importance of rapid diagnosis α ≈ 1
and good isolation of diagnosed patients l ≈ 0 in controlling an outbreak. While there is some
indication in the data from Hong Kong of a possible slowing of the outbreak, we did not attempt
to analyze the slowing or assess its significance.
5 Conclusions
A simple model that can capture the effect of average infectiousness in a heterogeneous pop-
ulation and the effect of isolating diagnosed patients has been introduced to explore the role
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of patient isolation and diagnostic rate in controlling a SARS outbreak. By examining two
cases with relatively clean exponential growth curves for the number of recognized cases, we
are able to calibrate a SEIJR model with parameters α = 1/3 (SARS’ diagnostic rate) and
l ≈ 0.4 (isolation effectiveness). We then use our SEIJR model to examine the non-exponential
dynamics of the Toronto outbreak. Two features of the Toronto data, the steep increase in the
number of recognized cases after March 31st and rapid slowing in the growth of new recognized
cases, robustly constrained the SEIJR model by requiring that l ≈ 0.05 and α > 1/3 days−1.
The model is also used to look at the impact of drastic control measures (isolation). The
fitting of data shows that the initial rates of SARS’ growth are quite similar in most regions
leading to estimates of R0 between 1.1 and 1.2 despite the recent identification of superspreaders.
Model simulations are fitted to SARS reported data for the province of Ontario, Hong Kong
and Singapore. Good fits are obtained for reasonable values of α, the rate of identification
of SARS infections; “reasonable” values of the control parameters l (a measure of isolation);
possible values of p, a crude measure of reduced susceptibility (due to genetic factors, age or
reduced contact rates); q a crude measure of the relative degree of infectiousness of asymp-
tomatic individuals; possible values of ρ a measure of initial levels of population heterogeneity;
and, reasonable values of N the effective population size. It is worth noticing that for values of
N larger than 100, 000 the predictions (proportion of cases at the end of the outbreak, etc.) are
roughly the same. The introduction of behavioral changes that follow the identification of the
first case (reduce values of l at the time of the identification and moving aggressively to identify
cases of SARS by increasing 1/α) result in a dramatic reduction in the total number of cases
and on mortality in Toronto. Given the fact that SARS appears to kill between three and seven
percent of infected (diagnosed) cases ([35]), it seems quite appropriate to isolate diagnosed
people. Although we do not examine the effect of quarantine by varying q, it seems intuitive
that quarantining those who came into close contact with positively diagnosed individuals will
reduce the total number of cases.
Model results and simple estimates suggest that local outbreaks may follow similar patterns.
Furthermore, the use of relative extreme isolation measures in conjunction with rapid diagnosis
has strong impact on the local dynamics (Toronto’s situation). However, if SARS has shown us
anything it is that “undetected” and “unchecked” local disease dynamics can rapidly become
a global issue.
The research on this article used the latest data available (April 18 for Canada and April
21 for Hong Kong and Singapore). Recent disclosures [34] reaffirm the importance of carrying
out the analysis excluding data from China. We have redone the analysis including the data
collected up to April 25 and, our conclusions, remain the same. Current data seem to support
higher values for SARS induced mortality rates [35]. However, our model ismost sensitive to the
parameters l (effectiveness of isolation) and (α) diagnostic rate. It is not as sensitive to changes
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in δ. In fact, the consideration of a 7% mortality (δ ≈ 0.01) rather than 4% reduces the number
of cases by about 12%. In Toronto, we have estimated 612 diagnosed cases with (l = 0.05 and
α = 1/3 after March 26th). Perfect isolation after March 26th, (l = 0.00) reduces this number
to 396 diagnosed cases. The assumption of homogenous mixing implies that our model is likely
to overestimate the size of the outbreak. Hence, the situation in Toronto seems to support
the view that this outbreak is being contained. Obviously, the case of the crude model (by
design) cannot handle high levels of variability (an stochastic model would be desirable). This
possibility is tested (as it is often done in deterministic models) by looking at the sensitivity of
the model to parameters (α and l being the most critical). Such sensitivity analyses can also
help “estimate” the variability in R0.
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7 Tables
Table 1. Parameter definitions and values that fit the cumulative number of cases in class J
(“diagnosed”) for Hong Kong. These parameters are used to compute the basic reproductive
number R0.
Parameter Definition Value
β Transmission rate per day .75
q relative measure of infectiousness for the asymptomatic class E 0.1
l relative measure of reduced risk among diagnosed SARS cases 0.38
p reduction in risk of SARS infection for class S2 0.1
k rate of progression to the infectious state per day 1
3
α rate of progression from infective to diagnosed per day 1
3
γ1 rate at which individuals in the infectious class recover per day
1
8
γ2 rate at which diagnosed individuals recover per day
1
5
δ SARS-induced mortality per day 0.006
ρ Initial proportion of the popualtion at higher risk of SARS infection 0.4
Table 2. Estimated starting times of the SARS outbreak.
Country Estimated start of the outbreak
Canada February 1st
Hong Kong November 20th
Singapore December 6th
World data November 5th
Table 3. Long-time model results for Ontario, Canada, assuming various changes in behavior
on March 26th, 2003.
l α Infected with SARS Diagnosed with SARS
0.05 1/3 0.0077% 0.0055%
0.3 1/3 18% 13%
0.05 1/6 21% 13%
12
8 Figures
Figure 1: A schematic representation of the flow of individuals between the different classes.
The model considers two distinct susceptible classes: S1, the most susceptible, and S2. β
I+qE+lJ
N
is the transmission rate to S1 from E, I and J . p is a measure of reduced susceptibility to SARS
in class S2. E is the class composed of asymptomatic, possibly infectious individuals. The class
I denotes infected, symptomatic, infectious, and undiagnosed individuals. I-individuals move
into the diagnosed class J at the rate α. Individuals recover from class I at the rate γ1 and
γ2 from the J class. The rate δ is SARS’ disease-induced mortality. The classes R and D are
included to keep track of the cumulative number of diagnosed, recovered and dead individuals,
respectively. The quantity C is for comparison with epidemiological statistics; it tracks the
total number of diagnosed individuals.
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Figure 2: The cumulative number of SARS cases from March 31 to April 14 (lin-log scale) for
the World (top row), Hong Kong(second row), Ontario, Canada (fourth row), all of Canada
(third row) and Singapore (bottom row). The data were obtained from WHO [30] except for
the Canadian data which are from the Canadian Ministry of Health [26]. The Ontario data
includes suspected and probable cases since March 31. This inclusion explains the jump in the
data for Ontario on March 31st. The rates of growth of the SARS outbreak (computed using
data from March 31 to April 14) are: 0.041 (world), 0.050 (Hong Kong), 0.037 (Singapore),
0.054 (Canada) and 0.054 (Ontario).
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Figure 3: The circles are the cumulative number of suspected or probable SARS cases in Ontario
beginning on day 61 (March 31st, the day of the jump) and the number of probable cases up
until day 60. The data prior to day 61 only bound the model from below. The lines are the
cumulative number of “diagnosed” cases C from the SEIJR model (C is the running sum of all
diagnosed cases J). The fit to the data is given by a change in the values of α and l on March
26th. Prior to March 26th, α = 1/6, l = 0.76. Because the model is poorly constrained prior
to day 61, the real purpose of this part of the model is to generate sufficiently large classes of
E and I relative to J on March 26th to give the fast increase in C from day 61 to day 67.
After March 26th, three scenarios are shown. The fit to the data is given by α = 1/3, l = 0.05
(rapid diagnosis and effective isolation of diagnosed cases, dashed line). The second curve is
given by α = 1/6, l = 0.05 (slow diagnosis and effective isolation, dotted line) and the third
curve by α = 1/3, l = 0.3 (rapid diagnosis with improved but imperfect isolation, dash-dot
line). An index case is assumed on February 1st. The transmission rate β is computed using
the estimated rate of growth (r = 0.0543) for the Ontario data as described in the text.
15
100 120 140 160
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Time (days)
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 n
um
be
r o
f S
AR
S 
ca
se
s
Hong Kong
100 120 140 160
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Time (days)
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 n
um
be
r o
f S
AR
S 
ca
se
s
Singapore
Mar 18 
Apr 21 
Mar 18 
Apr 21 
Figure 4: Cumulative number of SARS cases in Hong Kong and Singapore as a function of time
(SEIJR model) with l = 0.38 (Hong Kong) and l = 0.40 (Singapore). Singapore has β = 0.68,
all other parameter are from Table 1. The data is fitted starting March 31 (see Figure 2)
because of the jump in reporting on March 30th.
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